independent control. This view was advanced by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978: 170) , who identified the provision of advice and counsel and the exercise of control as two primary components of a board's internal administrative function (see also Westphal, 1999) .
The governance literature also suggests that there is considerable variance in the degree to which directors make an actual impact on strategic decision making, with some boards unable to monitor or advise management effectively (Mace, 1971; Wade, O'Reilly, & Chandratat, 1990 ). Prior empirical studies have focused primarily on lack of board power as an explanation for limited board involvement. For example, it is often proposed that boards are less likely to exert control over strategic decision making on behalf of shareholders when they lack formal or social independence from management-as indicated by the percentage of outside or nonexecutive directors, or the prevalence of friendship ties or other social connections between managers and directors (Baliga, Moyer, & Rao, 1996; Boeker & Goodstein, 1993; Hill & Snell, 1988; Kesner, Victor, & Lamont, 1986; Mallette & Fowler, 1992; Wade et al., 1990 ). However, as Westphal's (1998: 530 ) recent review of the literature suggests, there is little consistent evidence that board independence or "structural power" increases board involvement in strategic decision making.
Several authors have noted the persistent challenges faced by directors in making meaningful contributions to corporate strategy, regardless of their power to do so (Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989; Westphal, 1999; Westphal & Zajac, 1997) . Such challenges have been held to stem in part from questions of whether many direc-tors have suitable knowledge or information to contribute meaningfully to strategy. For instance, it has been repeatedly suggested that outside directors are often inadequately prepared to participate in board discussions because their time and attention are divided and diluted by their other board appointments; serving on boards at multiple companies makes it difficult for them to gain an adequate understanding of the issues facing any one firm. For these reasons, proponents of governance reform have strongly advocated limits to the number of boards upon which directors may sit (Business-Week, 1997).
A number of empirical studies have examined how board power and independence affect policy outcomes, but very little research represents an attempt to identify factors that determine whether boards have adequate knowledge and information to make meaningful contributions to strategic decision making. Moreover, research has not addressed the specific question of how multiple board appointments affect directors' ability to contribute to strategy. To address these questions, we developed a sociocognitive perspective on how appointments to other boards affect the capability of the members of a firm's board to monitor and advise its management in the strategic decision making process. We tested our theoretical perspective with a unique data set that combines archival reports with primary behavioral data obtained through surveys of Forbes 1000 outside directors and CEOs. The theoretical perspective and empirical analysis presented here may help answer recent calls for research that examines the "substantive context" of board appointments (Nohria, 1992: 14) and moves our understanding beyond the simple number of such appointments or director independence as predictors of board influence and decision making (Mizruchi, 1996; Pettigrew, 1992; Stinchcombe, 1990) .
THEORY AND HYPOTHESES

Director Appointments and Board Involvement in Strategic Decision Making
The sociocognitive perspective developed in this study suggests the importance of directors' networks of appointments to other boards in determining whether they have the appropriate strategic knowledge and perspective to monitor and advise management in the strategic decision making process. As noted above, critics of corporate governance have typically argued that directors' appointments to other boards reduce their ability to contribute to decision making at a focal board.
Such an argument assumes that the knowledge and perspective gained on other boards are largely irrelevant to decision making at the focal firm. In contrast, our sociocognitive perspective indicates how experience on other boards can enhance or diminish directors' ability to contribute to strategy, by focusing their attention on relevant strategic issues.
The sociocognitive perspective on organizational decision making suggests that individuals cope with complex decision making tasks by relying upon the schemata or "knowledge structures" they have developed about their environment (Kiesler & Sproull, 1982; Walsh, 1995) . In the absence of complete information, or given uncertainty regarding the relevance of different pieces of information, individuals tend to follow a top-down or theorydriven approach to decision making, rather than a bottom-up or data-driven approach based on present information (Abelson & Black, 1986; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Ocasio, 1997) . Given the extreme information complexity facing directors in evaluating strategic decisions (Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) , they can be expected to rely heavily upon the implicit theories that they have developed regarding corporate strategy and the competitive environment. Moreover, from this perspective, the knowledge structures that individuals use to cope with information-processing demands are developed from experience in similar roles (Dearborn & Simon, 1958; Walsh, 1995) .
In our framework, directors are likely to use knowledge structures developed from their experience on other boards. The literature on interlocking directorates supports this view. This work demonstrates how the involvement of directors on other boards provides an important source of information about business practices and policies (cf. Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer, Jennings, & Zhou, 1993) . For example, Useem (1982) observed that executives use their board appointments as a way to scan the environment for timely and pertinent information. He quoted several executives who suggest that board appointments provide a vehicle for learning, making such statements as "Direct involvement in other companies' affairs replaces an awful lot of reading ... it's a hell of a tool for top management education" (1982: 209-210) . Similarly, directors can learn about the efficacy of different practices and how to implement them properly by observing the consequences of management decisions (Haunschild, 1993). Such learning is particularly vivid because directors observe the decision-making process firsthand in their monitoring role, participate actively by giving advice to management, and then witness the consequences of those decisions.
Directors also learn about business practices through their communication with other directors in board and committee meetings. Information acquired from fellow directors may be particularly influential because it often comes from a trusted source (Davis, 1991; Useem, 1982; Weick, 1995) . This information is typically more timely and upto-date than that derived from secondary sources, and it may also be more salient because of its recency (Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982) . Thus, a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement emphasizes how directors' social structural context, including their ties to other boards, provides direct strategic experience and indirect access to strategic information through social contact with other directors. Such experience and information can, in turn, critically inform the knowledge structures used to monitor decisions or give advice on a focal board. In the following section, we further develop our sociocognitive perspective to consider variation in the strategic context of director ties to other boards, in order to address whether and when those ties provide relevant strategic knowledge and perspective for monitoring and advising the management of a focal firm.
Environmental Stability and Director Involvement in Strategic Decision Making
Related board ties and involvement in stable environments. Environmental stability refers to the extent to which a firm's competitive environment is complex, uncertain, and prone to strategic change (Huber & McDaniel, 1986) . It is emphasized here because such stability is a key determinant of the particular strategic issues facing a firm and its top management (Duncan, 1972; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) . Accordingly, environmental stability may be an important determinant of how directors can contribute to strategic decision making. Theory and research on environmental turbulence and strategic decision making distinguish between two basic strategic issues in the decision-making process-the development of new strategies and the implementation of existing strategies-and suggest that, in stable environments, the latter is more important. Specifically, if there is less change in an environment, there is less need to regularly identify new strategic alternatives in order to maintain fit with the environment, so firms in stable environments are more likely to compete primarily through the better implementation of existing strategies (Andrews, 1971; Fredrickson, 1984; Ginsberg, 1990; Tushman & Romanelli, 1985) . Moreover, Fama and Jensen (1983) explicitly recognized board monitoring of strategy implementation as an important component of a board's obligation to protect shareholders.
How then might directors' ties to other boards enhance their ability to monitor and advise management on the implementation of existing strategies in a stable environment? We suggest that directors will be better able to contribute to strategy in such an environment when their other board ties are strategically related to the focal firm. Strategically related board ties refer to a director's appointments to the boards of other companies that follow similar corporate strategies and operate in similar product-market and international market contexts. A central tenet of the strategy literature is that the effectiveness of strategy implementation is contingent on strategy content (Barney & Zajac, 1994; Galbraith & Kazanjian, 1986) . For instance, research suggests that a strategy of diversification requires different kinds of corporate reward systems and information systems than strategies that focus on a single market (Galbraith & Merrill, 1991; Gerhart & Milkovich, 1990; Gomez-Mejia, 1992) . Thus, given that strategically related ties enable directors to observe firsthand the experiences of other firms in implementing similar strategies, they provide directors with a more sophisticated understanding of the combination of systems and structures needed for successful implementation of the firm's strategy. Moreover, strategically related board ties also help directors acquire relevant knowledge through social interaction with other directors in board and committee meetings, as board members evaluate management and raise ideas and suggestions for better strategy implementation.
From a sociocognitive perspective, these social connections and opportunities for vicarious learning can lead to more highly developed knowledge structures for implementing the focal firm's strategy. Research on sociocognition has shown that individuals who have experience concentrated in a related domain, rather than dispersed across different contexts, have more highly developed knowledge structures for that domain, with fewer schema categories and more information units per category (Day & Lord, 1992; Lurigio & Carroll, 1985; Sujan, Sujan, & Bettman, 1988) . As a result, individuals engaging in problem solving for domains (such as strategy) where they have concentrated experience not only have more information at their disposal, but also have more efficiently structured information, and this leads to faster and more accurate information processing (Day & Lord, 1992).
Thus, to the extent that firms in stable environments compete primarily through better implementation of existing strategies (rather than iden-tification of new strategies to fit a changing environment), strategically related board ties should enhance directors' ability to contribute to strategic decision making in stable environments through monitoring and advice interactions. This point suggests several related hypotheses. The first hypothesis addresses the effect of a director's appointments to other boards on his or her perceived ability to contribute to a focal board. Involvement with other firms following strategies similar to those of a focal firm better equips a director to monitor management decision making and provide relevant information and advice to managers on the focal board. Thus, such an individual may perceive him or herself to be better able to contribute to strategic decision making. In effect, a director's perceived ability to contribute to decision making is expected to mediate the effect of appointments to other boards on involvement in monitoring and advice interactions. The first hypothesis, which predicts that strategically related board appointments will increase a director's perceived ability to contribute to decision making, concerns one portion of this mediated relationship.
Two additional hypotheses address the overall, board-level relationship between the portfolio of all directors' appointments and actual board behavior. As discussed above, boards may contribute to strategic decision making by regularly monitoring the decision-making process, as suggested by agency theorists, or by providing advice to top managers on strategic issues. The theoretical perspective developed here suggests that in stable environments, board appointments to strategically related firms should enhance the capacity of a focal firm's board members to contribute to strategic decision making through increased monitoring activity or the provision of more advice to management on strategic issues. Thus, Hypothesis la. In a stable environment, the appointment of a director to the boards of other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm will increase the director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions of strategic issues. Hypothesis lb. In a stable environment, the appointment of a director to the boards of other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm will increase the level of board monitoring of strategic decision making.
Hypothesis
c. In a stable environment, the appointment of a director to the boards of other firms that are strategically related to the focal firm will increase the level of board advice interactions on strategic issues.
Heterogeneous
board ties and involvement in unstable environments. As noted above, unstable environments are characterized by a relatively high level of unpredictable change or volatility (Aldrich, 1979; Duncan, 1972; Sharfman & Dean, 1991) , which places considerable informationprocessing demands on corporate leaders (Carpenter & Fredrickson, 2001; Fredrickson & Mitchell, 1984; Priem, 1990; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993) . In such environments, organizational success often depends on the ability of top managers to identify new strategic alternatives that maintain an organization's fit with its changing environment (Haleblian & Finkelstein, 1993; Tushman & Anderson, 1986). Thus, leaders must not only attend to the current strategy, but must also recognize when and how that strategy should be changed.
Our sociocognitive perspective suggests that in turbulent environments, directors' ability to contribute to strategy is enhanced by a combination of strategically related board ties and ties to firms that follow different strategies than does a focal firm. As in stable environments, board involvement with similar companies provides information and knowledge that can enhance a director's ability to monitor the firm's current strategy. Moreover, board ties to similar companies can also help a director stay abreast of changes in the business environment.
However, board involvement with companies following different strategies and operating in different business environments typically provides directors with greater knowledge and insight about a broad range of potential strategic alternatives. As discussed above, our perspective suggests that board ties to firms with related strategies can provide firsthand experience and indirect information through social contact with other directors that leads to more highly developed knowledge structures related to implementing a firm's current strategy. Research has also shown that well-developed knowledge structures can hinder effective information processing outside an individual's area of expertise. For instance, individuals with more concentrated exposure to a particular problem-solving approach or strategy are less likely to notice or consider alternative approaches (Dutton & Duncan, 1987; Ocasio, 1997) . Thus, when directors' other appointments are concentrated among similar companies, they are less likely to notice strategic alternatives emerging in other environments. In effect, directors' schemata for major strategic alternatives are highly focused on a limited range of options.
Similarly, the social cohesion perspective on network ties suggests that if the appointments of the directors of a firm's board are highly concentrated among firms with very similar strategies, these individuals are more likely to become socialized into accepting the firm's current strategy (Burt, 1987; Palmer et al., 1993) . Social network ties, including board interlock ties, channel social influence as well as information (Burt, 1987; Davis, 1991; Walker, 1985) . Thus, through their participation in monitoring implementation of similar strategies at other firms, directors with strategically related board ties should tend to develop beliefs that justify those strategies and accept them as appropriate. As a result, when external appointments are largely concentrated among firms with strategies similar to the focal firm's, this similarity may reinforce existing managerial commitment to the current strategy and lead directors to ignore environmental changes that threaten its long-term viability (note that strategically related ties may not increase commitment to the current mode of strategy implementation, because such ties link the focal board with firms that have similar strategy content, but not necessarily similar implementation).
Thus, in turbulent environments, directors can benefit from interlocks that expose them to possible strategic alternatives. Such ties effectively broaden the schemata or knowledge structures that directors use in monitoring and advising management, so that boards are not only more likely to identify appropriate strategic alternatives to a current strategy, but are also more willing to change the current strategy in order to maintain the organization's fit with its changing environment. In effect, board ties to firms with different strategies can help prevent or counteract excessive managerial commitment to a firm's current strategy (Hambrick, Geletkanycz, & Fredrickson, 1993; Weick, 1995) . Alternatively, when director appointments are concentrated among strategically dissimilar firms, with very few board ties to firms following similar strategies, a board may lack sufficient expertise to monitor the firm's current strategy or to assess the organizational implications of abandoning the strategy. Indeed, a common dilemma facing firms is how to develop new strategies while simultaneously implementing current strategies (Kazanjian & Drazin, 1987) . Therefore, in unstable environments, an optimal portfolio of outsider board appointments may include a heterogeneous mix of ties to strategically similar and dissimilar firms (that is, both firms with strategies similar to those of the focal firm and those with dissimilar strategies). Such heterogeneity is likely to wed the knowledge and expertise requisite to monitor ongoing implementation of the current strategy with information and advice about possible strategic alternatives that would allow the firm to maintain fit with its changing environment (Ginsberg, 1990 ).
This perspective is consistent with the view, presented in the top management team literature, that exposure to different beliefs about means-ends relationships (different beliefs about what strategies lead to high performance) through greater diversity of backgrounds and experience can facilitate adaptation in turbulent environments by stimulating debate about the appropriateness of a current strategy and about the feasibility of strategic alternatives that such familiarity reduces emotional conflict resulting from demographic diversity. For these reasons, heterogeneous experiences among board members may not enhance affective conflict, given abundant evidence that directors of Forbes 1000 firms are not only familiar with one another, but often form cohesive social bonds in board and committee meetings and through social interaction outside of formal meetings (Useem, 1982) . Thus, in our sociocognitive framework, diversity in the strategic experience of board members through network ties to other firms should enhance their ability to contribute in turbulent environments by engendering debate or task-related conflict about a firm's current strategy. Such interaction should facilitate adaptation to environmental changes (Wiersema & Bantel, 1992) . Moreover, given the social cohesion characterizing most boards, the benefits of debate and taskrelated conflict among directors should not be overwhelmed by affective conflict. These benefits from diversity in strategy experience are less relevant in stable environments where there is less need to engage in strategic change to maintain fit with the environment.
This argument leads to a second set of hypotheses. Hypothesis 2a, which parallels Hypothesis la, addresses how an individual director's board appointments may enhance her or his perceived ability to contribute to decision making, given that such perceptions are expected to mediate the effect of appointments to other boards on involvement in monitoring and advice interactions. Our theoretical argument that heterogeneous board ties can enhance involvement in turbulent environments implies that, to the extent that an individual director's board ties complement the ties of other directors with respect to strategic relatedness, thus increasing board heterogeneity, the director should be better able to contribute to the board through monitoring and advice interactions. According to this logic, for instance, a director with many board appointments to strategically dissimilar firms is particularly valuable to a focal board if the ties of other directors are concentrated among strategically similar firms. Two additional hypotheses, 2b and 2c, which parallel Hypotheses lb and Ic, address how board-level ties may affect actual board behaviors in unstable environments. The theoretical argument developed above would suggest that in such environments, boards with a heterogeneous mix of links to both strategically different and strategically similar firms should be better able to contribute to strategic decision making through either increased monitoring activity or more frequent advice to management on strategic issues. Hypothesis 2a. In an unstable environment, the greater the extent to which a director's board appointments to other firms complement the appointments of other directors in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the greater the director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions of strategic issues. Hypothesis 2b. In an unstable environment, the greater the extent to which directors' board appointments are heterogeneous in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the higher the level of board monitoring of strategic decision making. Hypothesis 2c. In an unstable environment, the greater the extent to which directors' board appointments are heterogeneous in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the higher the level of board advice interactions on strategic issues.
METHODS
Sample and Data Collection
The sample frame for this study consisted of 600 large and medium-sized companies randomly selected from the Forbes 1000 index of U.S. industrial and service firms. To gauge the behavioral processes that characterize board involvement in strategic decision making, we sent a questionnaire survey to all 600 CEOs from these companies. In addition, to assess directors' perceptions about their involvement, we sent a second survey to each individual serving as an outside director at a company whose CEO had responded to the first survey (n = 1,312). All surveys were distributed in April 1995.
Although surveys have been used frequently to measure behavioral processes at lower levels of organizations, surveys of top managers have often suffered from low response rates (less than 25 percent). To ensure the highest possible response in this case, we took the following steps (Fowler, 1993; Groves, Cialdini, & Couper, 1992) : (1) An in-depth pretest was used to streamline the survey, making it easier and more appealing to complete (see further discussion below); (2) requests for participation linked the current study with an ongoing series of surveys on top management issues conducted by a major business school (to which hundreds of these CEOs' peers had responded), emphasized the need for research on CEO-board relations, and engaged respondents' natural interest in the topic (see Groves et al., 1992) ; and (3) about 21 days after the initial mailing, nonrespondents were sent a second letter with a new questionnaire. In total, 263 CEOs and 564 outside directors responded, representing response rates of 44 percent and 43 percent, respectively. These response rates are high in comparison to those of other top management surveys (cf. Pettigrew, 1992) . Data on diversification, internationalization, or board interlocks were unavailable for 35 of the responding companies; thus, survey data from 228 CEOs and 492 outside directors are used in the analyses, numbers representing 38 percent of all CEOs and directors in the sample frame (that is, on the average, the final sample includes 2.2 directors per company in the CEO survey).
To check for nonresponse bias, we collected archival data for companies in the larger sample frame. For the 531 companies with complete data, we examined whether respondents and nonrespondents differed significantly on several different variables derived from archival sources using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov two-sample test (Siegel & Castellan, 1988) . This test assesses whether significant differences exist in the distribution of respondents and nonrespondents for a given variable, including differences in central tendency, dispersion, skewness, and so forth. The results of this test provide consistent evidence across multiple variables that respondents and nonrespondents come from the same population. Moreover, separate analyses also showed that directors in the survey sample were representative of directors in the larger sample frame (all outside directors at the 531 companies for which complete archival data were available) with respect to (1) the independent variables (such as relatedness of individual directors' board ties), and (2) director characteristics included as control variables in the study (such as management experience, education level, board tenure, and functional background). Thus, it appears that sample selection bias was not present in the data.
Data on board interlocks, director characteristics, ownership, and board structure were obtained from the following sources: Standard & Poor's Register of Corporations, Directors, and Executives, the Dun & Bradstreet Reference Book of Corporate Managements, Who's Who in Finance and Industry, and corporate proxy statements. Data on firm diversification and international operations were obtained from the PC-COMPUSTAT Business Segment Database and from Compact Disclosure. Size and performance data were also obtained from PC-COMPUSTAT. All independent and control variables were gauged in the period t -1, and dependent variables were gauged at time t.
Dependent Measures
Data for our three dependent variables, directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions, board monitoring, and board advice interactions were gathered through surveys. To enhance the construct validity of the survey measures, we conducted a pretest involving in-depth pilot interviews with 22 top managers and board members (cf. Fowler, 1993: 102). Following Judge and Zeithaml (1992) , in the questionnaire we defined strategic issues as nonroutine, resource allocation decisions that should affect the performance of an organization. We further sought to develop survey questions that would assess a board's involvement in either the implementation or the consideration of new strategies. We used feedback from participants in the pretest to ensure that the items would capture both areas of strategic issue involvement and, in the survey, included additional questions that focus on each area of involvement. After completing the pilot questionnaire, each individual was asked to identify questions that were unclear, difficult to answer, or potentially subject to bias. These interviews were also used to ensure that questions were interpreted as expected, to identify improvements to the format of the survey, and to modify its length. Multiple response formats were used to reduce response bias, and items measuring each construct were scattered throughout the survey (DeVellis, 1991). Moreover, we carefully worded questions to minimize the likelihood of social desirability bias, using input from the pilot interviews.
Director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions was measured with a multi-item scale in the director survey. Specific items in this scale assess the degree to which directors perceive that they have sufficient knowledge on relevant strategic issues to contribute to board discussions and the degree to which they feel adequately prepared to contribute. Cronbach's alpha for this scale was .88, suggesting acceptable interitem reliability (Nunnally, 1978) . After a factor analysis was applied to the survey items using the iterated principal factors method, a scree test indicated one common factor, and promax rotation verified that all items loaded on the same factor as expected, with loadings for each item greater than .5. Thus, we estimated factor scores using the Bartlett method (Harman, 1976) .
Board advice interactions and board monitoring were also assessed with multi-item scales. The wording of each question was developed from available qualitative research (Alderfer, 1986;  Demb & Neubauer, 1992; Lorsch & MacIver, 1989) suggesting how top managers and directors describe CEO-board interaction and the board's role vis-a-vis management (for instance, as a sounding board on strategic issues); in addition, we used feedback from the pilot interviews to further improve the clarity and face validity of each question. For instance, questions about advice interactions asked about the extent to which the CEO solicited board input on corporate strategy and the frequency of advice and council discussions with board members, and monitoring questions asked about the extent to which the board monitored strategic decision making or evaluated CEO performance. The Appendix gives specific items. These measures assess monitoring and advice interactions at the board level. We also conducted separate analyses of individual director involvement in monitoring and advice interactions; the results of these analyses were consistent with those reported below for boards.
The iterated principal factors method was then again applied to the survey items. A scree test showed two common factors, and promax rotation indicated that the monitoring and advice items loaded on different factors as expected, with loadings for each item greater than .5 on one factor and less than .2 on the other. Furthermore, Cronbach's alpha was .92 for the monitoring scale and .89 for the advice interactions scale, again indicating acceptable reliability (Nunnally, 1978) . Accordingly, given encouraging evidence regarding interitem reliability and discriminant validity (that is, the factor loadings suggesting that CEOs discriminated between the two constructs as expected), we also estimated the monitoring and advice factors using the Bartlett method (Harman, 1976) .
Further analyses were conducted to assess the interrater reliability of these measures. Specifically, we compared CEO and outside director responses by calculating kappa coefficients for the monitoring and advice items. Kappa is a correlation coefficient that corrects for the expected level of correlation between raters (chance correlation). Values exceeding .75 are typically thought to indicate excellent agreement beyond chance, and values between .40 and .75 are considered indicative of fair to good agreement beyond chance (Fleiss, 1981; Landis & Koch, 1977) . The sample for this analysis included companies with a responding CEO and at least one responding director (n = 188). Kappa coefficients exceed .75 for all survey items but one, which achieved .73, and the overall kappa is .82. Given these high levels of interrater reliability, it is perhaps not surprising that the hypothesized effects presented below were substantively unchanged when monitoring and advice interac-tions were measured with director responses rather than CEO responses, or vice-versa.
Independent Measures
Related board appointments in stable environments. Hypotheses la-lc predict the effects of individual directors' board appointments to other firms that are strategically related to a focal firm. In our measures of relatedness, inside and outside directors were combined, as separate analyses revealed no significant differences in results when we distinguished between the two.
We measured relatedness across four different strategic dimensions that have been studied extensively in the strategy literature (e.g., Kim, 1989; Porter, 1986 Porter, , 1998 Rumelt, 1974) : First, board appointments related by product market were measured as the number of a director's appointments to the boards of companies in a primary business similar (having the same four-digit Standard Industrial Classification [SIC] code) to that of a focal firm, divided by the director's total number of appointments. Second, board appointments related by foreign market were measured by counting appointments to the boards of companies with the same primary foreign market as a focal firm, normalized by the number of appointments. For example, two firms that reported France as their primary foreign market would exhibit a high degree of foreign market relatedness. In separate analyses, we weighted appointments according to the difference between a focal firm's presence in each of its markets (as a portion of total sales) and the appointed-to firm's presence. The results presented below were substantively unchanged, demonstrating that they were robust to different measures of foreign market relatedness.
For the third dimension of strategic relatedness, we assessed the diversification of a focal firm and of the other firms to which a director was connected using the entropy measure (Palepu, 1985) . This measure takes into account the number of segments in which a firm operates and weights each segment according to its contribution to total sales. It is defined as follows: YPi x ln(l/Pi), where P is the sales (dollar value) attributed to segment i and ln(l/P,) is the weight for each segment i, or the logarithm of the inverse of its sales. We calculated the absolute difference between the diversification of a focal firm and the diversification of each of the other firms to which a director was connected. The difference scores were then added and normalized by the total number of appointments. This figure was then subtracted from the highest value of diversification dissimilarity in the sample, so that higher values indicate greater relatedness. The reason for calculating relatedness as an average can be illustrated with the following example: say one firm's board (A) has 18 ties with firms that are relatively dissimilar to the focal firm (the relatedness is .1 for each tie), and another board (B) has three ties with firms that are very similar to the focal firm (the relatedness is .6 for each tie). Failing to normalize these measures would give each board a comparable relatedness score, when in fact B's directors have more related experience.
Appointments related by degree of internationalization, our fourth dimension, were measured with a variation of the degree of internationalization (DOI) composite measure validated by Sullivan (1994) . This measure gauges internationalization in terms of three important and theoretically distinct characteristics. The first characteristic, foreign sales, is calculated as a ratio of foreign sales to total sales and reflects a firm's dependence on sales to foreign markets. The second characteristic, foreign production, reflects a firm's reliance on owned foreign asset stocks and is measured by foreign assets as a percentage of total assets. As in research on international business, here the sales and asset characteristics address a firm's dependence on foreign consumer markets and dependence on foreign production resources, respectively. The third characteristic, geographic dispersion, gauges a firm's number of country subsidiaries as a percentage of the highest number of country subsidiaries represented in our sample. Sullivan (1994) found that this characteristic provided a rough indication of the cultural variety associated with the previous two dimensions (Johansen & Vahlne, 1977) . All three DOI variables range theoretically from 0 to 1.
Foreign sales, foreign production, and geographic dispersion are summed to form our composite measure of DOI, which therefore has a theoretical range of 0 to 3. Like Sullivan (1994), we found that these variables demonstrated high interitem reliability (a = .86) and loaded on one factor with a high eigenvalue and high explained variance and that the composite measure was normally distributed. There are several single-indicator measures of DOI, including number of foreign subsidiaries and ratios such as foreign sales to total sales, foreign assets to total assets, and number of foreign employees to total employees, but Sullivan showed that these other measures are highly correlated. To gauge relatedness on this dimension of strategy, we calculated the absolute difference between the DOI of a focal firm and the DOI of each of the other firms to which a director was connected. Again, the difference scores were added and normalized by the number of appointments. We then subtracted this figure from the highest value of DOI dissimilarity in the sample to create an index of relatedness.
Hypotheses lb and lc predict the effects of board-level appointments to other firms that are strategically related to a focal firm on board behavior. To test these hypotheses, we developed a set of aggregate variables for the relatedness of individual director appointments across all directors on a board. For instance, we calculated product market similarity by counting the number of companies to which the focal firm was connected by a board tie in a primary business (as reflected in a four-digit SIC code) similar to that of the focal firm, divided by the total number of appointments. For analyses conducted at the level of the individual director, predicting the director's perceived ability to contribute (Hypotheses la and 2a) , the variables were calculated for the particular director.
Heterogeneous board appointments in unstable environments. To test Hypotheses 2a through 2c, we developed separate measures of the heterogeneity of board appointments. First, we assessed the extent to which an individual director's board appointments to other firms differed from the appointments of other directors in their strategic relatedness to a focal firm by calculating the absolute value of the difference between the director's relatedness score on a given strategic dimension and the average relatedness scores of other directors on the board (the measure of relatedness is defined above). High values indicated that a director's appointments differed from the appointments of other board members on a given dimension of relatedness. For example, if other directors had many appointments to firms with very similar international presences, a director with more appointments to firms with international strategy that differed from the focal firm's would have a relatively high heterogeneity score on that dimension.
Finally, we developed a set of variables measuring strategic heterogeneity at the board level to assess the effect of board appointments on involvement in turbulent environments. We measured the extent to which a board's portfolio of director appointments is heterogeneous in its relatedness on a given dimension as (SIri -1)/n, where ri is the relatedness score for director i, r is the average relatedness for the board, and n is the number of board members (note that this board-level measure excludes duplicate ties to the same firm). Higher values indicated greater heterogeneity in strategic relatedness; conversely, smaller values indicated that a firm's appointments were concentrated among firms that were either relatively similar or relatively dissimilar to the focal firm on a given strategic dimension.
Other Measures
Environmental instability, the change rate of environmental factors relevant to strategic decision making (Duncan, 1972) , is often a function of an industry's competitive dynamics (Chen, 1996; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Following Wiersema and Bantel (1993), we measured environmental instability as changes in the industry concentration ratio. This ratio is calculated as the percentage of an industry's sales, at the four-digit SIC level, accounted for by the four largest firms. Large absolute changes in the concentration ratio indicate high environmental instability. Such change reflects "shifts in market share due to new entrants, exits, consolidations, and erosion of market share, thus they capture the dynamic nature of a firm's industrial environment" (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993: 493). , 1997] ). The results presented below were substantively unchanged, demonstrating that they were robust to alternate measures of environmental instability.
We observed change over the three-year period prior to the survey date (1992-94). Moreover, we used (monthly) stock price volatility as an alternative measure of instability (calculated as the average annual price coefficient of variation across all firms in the industry in a particular year [Haunschild & Miner
Several control variables were also included in the models. Following Wiersema and Bantel's (1992) classification scheme for level of education, we controlled for directors' education level using number of years of schooling (cf. Kosnik, 1987) . A director's years of higher-level education may indicate knowledge pertinent to strategic decision making, which may affect ability to contribute in potentially competing ways to appointment to other boards. Similarly, more extensive general management experience could also be associated with directors' ability to monitor and advise management. Therefore, we also controlled for management experience, measured as the number of years during which a director had previously worked on a top management team. In addition, we also controlled for the number of functional areas in which directors had prior experience, because their ability to contribute may be enhanced if they have a broader base of prior experience (see Finkelstein, 1992) . Directors may acquire firm-specific expertise over time; therefore, their tenure may influence the ability of directors to monitor and advise management. Thus, we controlled for the number of years directors had served on a board. Each of these four variables was averaged across directors in the board-level models.
We also controlled for the prior level of diversi-fication and internationalization, since the complexities involved in managing highly diversified and/or international firms may tend to require greater monitoring and/or advice capabilities (Sanders & Carpenter, 1998; Zajac & Westphal, 1994) . For similar reasons, we controlled for firm size, measured as the natural logarithm of firm sales. In addition, we controlled for prior firm performance in models of board monitoring and advice interactions. An adaptation perspective would suggest that relatively poor firm performance could prompt CEOs to appoint directors with relevant appointments to other boards to enhance the board's capability to monitor and/or provide advice (Cyert & March, 1963) . Two recent studies have provided evidence for a negative relationship between firm performance and board involvement in strategic decision making (Johnson, Hoskisson, & Hitt, 1993; Judge & Zeithaml, 1992). Accordingly, we included two measures of firm performance: prior return on equity, an accounting-based measure, and prior market-to-book value, a marketbased measure. Several studies contain the argument that CEOs co-opt boards, rendering them passive by appointing their friends as directors (e.g., Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1988) . Some researchers have also suggested that a CEO secures the passivity of outside directors simply by appointing them to the board (Alderfer, 1986; Boeker, 1992; Wade et al., 1990) . Moreover, recent research has shown that top managers' openness to board advice is largely determined by the portion of a board composed of a CEO's personal friends and the portion of the board composed of directors appointed after the CEO was appointed (Westphal, 1999) . Thus, we controlled for these variables (CEO-board friendship ties and appointments after the CEO) in the analyses, measuring friendship ties with questions in the CEO survey. We also included CEO ownership as a control variable in the monitoring and advice models. Agency theorists have argued that incentives can provide an alternative or substitute for board monitoring, and incentives can also motivate top managers to seek advice from a board (Beatty & Zajac, 1994; Rediker & Seth, 1995) . Moreover, incentives could motivate other directors to monitor strategic decision making more actively and to offer their expertise on strategic issues (Bergh, 1995) . Thus, we controlled for director ownership in analyses of board monitoring and advice interactions. In addition, we controlled for board size in these models, given that large boards may be less cohesive and thus less able to monitor decision making effectively (Johnson et al., 1993) . We also controlled for board size in models of directors' perceived ability to contribute to decision making because each director might see himself or herself as having less opportunity to contribute on a large board.
Prior studies have also examined whether a board's leadership structure is related to indicators of the board's ability to control management (e.g., Baliga et al., 1996; Finkelstein, 1992; Mallette & Fowler, 1992) . Thus, we controlled for leadership structure in models of board monitoring, using a dichotomous variable coded 1 if the CEO and board chair positions were separate and 0 otherwise. Although we did not expect board centrality to independently affect board involvement, in separate analyses we included different measures of centrality, such as in-degree centrality and the Bonacich measure (Wasserman & Faust, 1994) ; these measures yielded consistently nonsignificant results, and the hypothesized effects on board monitoring and advice interactions were unchanged. We also did not expect the hypothesized effects on advice interactions to be affected by the level of monitoring, or vice-versa, because the dependent variables were lagged and negatively correlated; separate analyses confirmed that the results were unchanged when the monitoring was included in the advice models and advice was included in the monitoring models. Table 1 provides the means, standard deviations, and bivariate correlations for all data used to analyze predictions of directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions. Table 2 provides these descriptive statistics for all data used to analyze predictions of board monitoring and advice interactions. Given that all our dependent variables were continuous and that the independent variables were continuous or categorical, multiple ordinary least squares (OLS) regression analysis was the primary statistical technique employed. The entire sample was dichotomized at the median of the environmental stability measure, with those firms falling below the median accordingly classified as in relatively stable industries and those falling above it classified as in relatively unstable industries. Thus, we ran separate sets of regressions for each subsample (stable and unstable) and another set using the product-term approach to test interaction effects. Analyses of directors' ability to contribute to board discussions were conducted for the sample of responding directors, and analyses of board monitoring and advice interactions were conducted for all companies in the survey sample.
RESULTS
Tables 3 and 4 present regression results.
Results of the multiple regression analysis testing Hypothesis la support the prediction that related appointments will be positively associated with directors' perceptions of their ability to contribute to board discussions in stable environments (Table  3) . For example, the coefficients for product-market, diversification, and internationalization relatedness were all positive and significant. And, 13 .10 .11  .16 .04 -.16 -.12 .05 -. 13 a n = 492 directors; for correlations greater than .13, p < .05. 09 .01 .06 .01 .12 .11 .03 .03 .04 -.05  .01 .04  0.31 0.25  .04 .17 .02 .11 .13 .12 .04 -.01 -.01 -.13 -.02  .07 .02 .27  0.06 0.08  .02 -.01  .05 .11 .05 -.02  .00 .08 .03 .12 .07 .06 .14 -.03  .01  0.13 0.11  .12 .03 -.01  .04 .03 .05 .03 .04 .09 -.16  .03 -.01  .03 -.07 -.05  .08  1.63 1.07 .12 .02 .05 .05 .04 .06 .02 -.02  .07 -.07  .05 -.03  .11 -.07 -.01  .11 .26  0.72 0.53  .16 .12 .24 .06 .11 .03 .25 .04 -.01  .06 .09 .07 -.10  .04 .03 -.04 -.07 -.10  0.67 0.49  .12 .20 .09 .20 .08 .23 .03 .19 .15 .04 .05 .07 -.08 -. 16 .28 .16 .21 .17 .23 .24 .11 .17 .15 .08 -.16 -.26 -.19  .25 -.12 -.10  19. Board advice interactions  0.00 0.80  .21 .15 .29 .19 .18 .12 .27 .20 .10 .19 .15 .04 .13 .22 .27 .14 -. 10 -.07 a n = 228 firms; for correlations greater than .13, p < .05. although the coefficient for foreign market relatedness was not significant, it was positive, as hypothesized. Conversely, the results indicate that having more board appointments to firms with different strategies tends to reduce directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions. These results held after we controlled for complementarity in strategic relatedness, which is consistently unrelated to directors' perceived ability to contribute in stable environments. Several control variables sig-nificantly predicted the ability to contribute, including a director's education level and tenure on the board and the number of functional areas in which the director had prior experience; board size was negatively related, as expected.
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A similar pattern of results provided robust support for Hypotheses lb and Ic (Table 3 ). Hypothesis lb predicts that, in stable environments, board appointments to other strategically related firms will be positively associated with the level of board monitor- 0.14 (0.18)  0.11 (0.27)  0.33 (0.26 ing of strategic decision making. Hypothesis Ic predicts that such appointments will be positively associated with the level of advice interactions on strategic issues. Three different kinds of strategic relatedness (product-market, diversification, and internationalization relatedness) were positively associated with both monitoring and advice interactions. Conversely, having more board appointments to firms with unrelated strategies was negatively associated with both kinds of involvement. A separate analysis provided evidence that directors' perceived abil-ity to contribute effectively mediated these relationships: when ability to contribute is added to models of monitoring and advice interactions, the effects of the relatedness variables become nonsignificant, and the coefficient for ability to contribute is strongly and positively significant in both models (Baron & Kenny, 1986) . Again, as shown in the table, we found that the hypothesized effects were significant even after controlling for heterogeneity in strategic relatedness, which is consistently unrelated to either form of board involvement. Hypothesis 2a is the first test of our theoretical framework in unstable competitive environments. Specifically, in such environments we predicted that the more a director's board appointments complemented the appointments of other directors in their strategic relatedness to the focal firm, the greater would be the director's perceived ability to contribute to board discussions. Table 4 shows the results of regression analyses predicting directors' perceived ability to contribute in unstable environments. Complementarity in strategic relatedness is positively related to directors' perceived ability to contribute for all four dimensions of corporate strategy, supporting Hypothesis 2a. At the same time, the results show that simple relatedness does not predict the ability to contribute.
The results for tests of Hypotheses 2b and 2c are also presented in Table 4 . Consistent with our predictions for unstable environments, the greater the heterogeneity of directors' board appointments in terms of product-market, diversification, and internationalization relatedness, the higher the level of board monitoring and advice interactions. Heterogeneity in foreign market relatedness was also marginally associated with advice interactions in such environments. These results held after the simple relatedness of board ties was controlled for; simple relatedness was generally unrelated to either kind of involvement. Moreover, separate analyses again suggested that directors' perceived ability to contribute to board discussions mediated the effects of complementary appointments on director monitoring and advice interactions. Thus, the results consistently show that the strategic relatedness of board ties increases director involvement in stable environments but does not do so in unstable environments. The opposite pattern emerges in unstable environments. We also conducted separate analyses using the product term approach to test interactions between environmental stability and the independent variables, and the interactions were significant, consistent with the splitsample findings.
To supplement the primary analyses of overall board involvement presented above, we conducted further analyses that focused on board involvement in either strategy implementation or the consideration of new strategies using additional survey items (such as "To what extent does the board monitor the implementation of strategic decisions?"). In general, the relatedness of board ties was positively associated with reported involvement in implementation, and it was negatively associated with advice on new strategic alternatives in turbulent environments (this effect was not significant in stable environments). These results appear to further support our theoretical arguments, as we would expect directors who have expe-rience with related strategies to be more capable of contributing insight on implementation of a firm's current strategy. In contrast, directors who have experience with different strategies should be more capable of contributing insight about alternatives. Also, the nonsignificant effect of relatedness on advice about new strategic alternatives in stable environments is consistent with the view that strategic change is relatively less important in stable environments than in turbulent environments. The implications of our combined results are discussed below.
DISCUSSION
Overview of Findings
Overall, the findings provided strong support for our theoretical framework. Empirical analyses yielded a consistent pattern of results suggesting that the monitoring and advising behavior of directors depends on the strategic perspective and base of expertise provided by their appointments to other boards. For example, strategically related board ties were found to enhance board involvement in firms facing relatively stable environments, and strategically heterogeneous board ties were found to enhance involvement in firms facing relatively unstable environments. Therefore, it would appear that the strategic context of director appointments, not simply the presence or number of such appointments, is an important influence on corporate governance.
A growing body of research on boards recognizes corporate director appointments as an indicator of access to information network flows (Mizruchi, 1996; Palmer et al., 1993) , but much of it has emphasized a firm's number of interlocks (centrality) as indicative of the extent to which it is integrated into a community of information. Critics of interlock research have emphasized the need to examine the "substantive context" of interlock appointments if their consequences are to be understood (Nohria, 1992 : 14; Pettigrew, 1992; Stinchcombe, 1990 ). Our findings address this issue by showing how board interlock ties affect a firm's corporate governance to the degree that such ties are aligned with the strategic needs of the firm. Thus, although the literature on interlocking directorates has tended to emphasize a firm's social context as an important determinant of organizational behavior, the findings of this study suggest that the effects of a firm's social structural context are moderated by its strategic context. Accordingly, this study extends network theories of corporate governance. The findings are consistent with a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement in which director ties to other boards 2001 provide direct strategic experience and indirect access to strategic information through social contact with other directors, which in turn can critically inform the knowledge structures used to monitor decisions or give advice on a focal board. Those knowledge structures can enhance board capability to contribute to strategic decision making if they address the primary strategic issues facing firms, such as implementation of existing strategies in stable environments versus the development of new strategies and implementation in turbulent environments. Conversely, knowledge structures conditioned by board ties to other firms can reduce a board's capability to contribute to strategy if these structures do not match the strategic contingencies facing the firm. This view is consistent with Granovetter's (1992) and Weick's (1995) social network embeddedness perspectives on organizational behavior, which suggest that individual action is conditioned by information spread through social structural relations, rather than strictly by an individual's personal decision-making capabilities or by widespread social norms. In extending this perspective to explain board involvement in strategic decision making, our study pinpoints the specific kinds of network ties that can influence behavior.
Moreover, research on board power and control has typically focused on structural board independence as a critical determinant of a board's ability to protect shareholder interests. Such research has not addressed whether and when directors have the appropriate strategic perspective and knowledge to exercise control effectively. In the behavioral literature on boards, low levels of director involvement have typically been attributed to the social and political influence of top managers over outside directors (cf. Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996) ; the findings of this study suggest that directors may also abstain from monitoring and advising management to the extent that they lack relevant strategic information and knowledge needed to contribute to the decision-making process. As more boards acquire the structural power needed to influence organizations (Useem, 1993; Westphal & Zajac, 1997) , it becomes increasingly important to develop models of board effectiveness that predict whether boards also have the ability to exercise their influence.
Although agency-based views on boards of directors attribute lower levels of director involvement to the significant costs associated with monitoring activities, such as the time required to prepare for meetings (Beatty & Zajac, 1994) , the perspective developed in this study suggests how and when the information and expertise directors gain from serv-ing on other boards can permit them to economize on governance costs, by raising the "returns" from investing a given amount of time and attention in the monitoring and advising of management at a particular firm. Our findings are consistent with the view that if directors' appointments to other boards provide them with relevant strategic information and expertise and focus their attention on relevant strategic issues (such as strategic change versus implementation), then directors are likely to realize positive sociocognitive "externalities" from their appointments to other boards. That is, investments in monitoring and advising at one firm provide directors with knowledge and perspective that raise the quality of their contributions at other firms with similar strategic priorities. Such externalities permit economies of monitoring and advising across firms. Conversely, directors' appointments may provide them with inappropriate strategic information and focus their attention away from critical strategic issues facing a focal firm. Under those conditions, directors may instead experience negative sociocognitive externalities from their other board memberships, thus leading to diseconomies of monitoring and advising.
Finally, some prior research on the diffusion of innovations has distinguished between a director's experience as an inside board member-at her or his home company-and experience as an outside director, at another company; these statuses are sometimes referred to as "directional" and "nondirectional," respectively (Palmer et al., 1993) . For instance, Palmer and his colleagues suggested that inside director ties may have stronger effects on the diffusion of innovations than outside director ties, because insiders are likely to devote more time than outsiders to implementing innovations, leading to greater psychological commitment to them (Palmer, Barber, Zhou, & Soysal, 1995; Palmer et al., 1993) . Similarly, directors' beliefs about corporate strategy might be influenced more by their experience as top managers at their home companies than by their experience as outside directors at other firms. In order to test this possibility empirically, we conducted separate analyses in which the relatedness of manager-director ties was measured separately from the relatedness of outside director ties. The hypothesized effects were supported for both sources of experience, and the effects of manager-director ties were not consistently stronger than the effects of outside director ties.
Limitations, Implications, and Conclusion
Limitations. Although the findings of this study are consistent with a sociocognitive perspective on board involvement in which board ties to other firms help determine whether directors have the appropriate knowledge and perspective to contribute to strategic decision making, our empirical approach does not permit a direct examination of the cognitions that mediate these relationships. This limitation is shared by most empirical research in the top management team literature, which is also largely rooted in a sociocognitive perspective (Finkelstein & Hambrick, 1996; Hambrick & Mason, 1984) . In addition, although we did measure the degree to which directors advised and monitored management, we were unable to assess the quality of the advice given or the extent to which it ultimately improved firm performance. Finally, the findings of this study may be less applicable to relatively small firms, whose directors tend to have fewer board appointments at other companies.
Future research directions. These limitations
suggest several directions for future research. Perhaps most importantly, research is still needed that goes beyond our relatively direct measures of board behavior to gauge the strategic expertise and perspectives of corporate board members, assessing how cognitions mediate the effects of board ties on strategic decision making. For instance, researchers could examine whether directors who have strategically related board ties demonstrate more nuanced understanding of the requirements for implementing that strategy. Content analysis might be used to measure the complexity of director recommendations regarding information systems, reward systems, and other systems and structures needed to implement strategies effectively. This approach has been used in research on group decision making to measure the complexity of group member cognitions (e.g., Tetlock, Peterson, McGuire, Chang, & Feld, 1992).
In addition, to the extent that the strategic relatedness or heterogeneity of board ties predicts director behaviors, such behaviors may have particular implications for firm performance. For instance, our theoretical argument would suggest that heterogeneous board ties could enhance performance for firms operating in turbulent environments. In partial support of this view, Uzzi (1996) found that firms in the highly turbulent women's fashion industry were most likely to survive when they possessed a combination of strong and diverse ties to other organizations. Thus, future research should study whether or not the congruence of environmental stability and director appointments similarly affects performance differentials among firms.
Research might also examine whether firms with appropriate board appointments rely less on alter-native control mechanisms. For example, Johnson and colleagues (1993) observed that boards influence firms either through strategic controls (such as board monitoring) or through financial mechanisms (such as managerial incentives). Therefore, in future studies, researchers might examine whether the addition of board appointments that provide relevant strategic expertise lead firms to reduce their reliance on financial controls, thus minimizing the costs associated with such controls (that is, the costs resulting from imposition of firmspecific risk on decision makers [Jensen & Meckling, 1976] ). Conversely, firms may rely more heavily on such financial controls where directors' appointments to other boards do not provide them with the relevant strategic perspective and knowledge base.
Finally, it should be noted that reciprocal board appointments are common in many countries (Demb & Neubauer, 1992). However, because research in non-U.S. settings has emphasized the social rather than the strategic nature of reciprocal board appointments (e.g., Stokman, Zeigler, & Scott, 1985) , there is an opportunity to extend the social psychological perspective developed in this study to research on corporate governance outside of the United States. For instance, given that there are markedly fewer restrictions on the types of board connections and the contents of communication flows between managers of different firms in European countries, the strategic context of board appointments may be even more influential there.
Managerial implications. In addition to their theoretical importance, the results of this research, have significant implications for both public policy and business practice. For example, there is growing external stakeholder pressure for the U.S. government to legislate constraints on board member appointments that go beyond the existing Clayton Act (Section 8) prohibition of certain kinds of interlocking directorates among direct competitors (BusinessWeek, 1997) . Indeed, the results presented here confirm that boards are less likely to be effective advisors and monitors when their members are appointed to the boards of other firms that are strategically irrelevant to the needs of a focal firm. Therefore, to the extent that firms are prevented from realizing benefits from the relatedness or the heterogeneity of appointments discussed in this research, additional legislated board constraints may have unintended negative consequences for the corporate governance of public U.S.
firms.
Similarly, there is evidence that corporate leaders give considerable weight to the number of other board memberships held by director candidates when selecting new outside directors for their boards (Davis, 1993). However, the results of this study suggest the need to consider whether a director will connect a firm with other organizations that can furnish relevant strategic knowledge and perspective, rather than simply focus on the number of board seats the candidate already holds. For example, if a firm in a turbulent industry has a board composed primarily of directors who sit on the boards of other firms with similar strategies, such a board's ability to monitor and advise may be considerably enhanced by appointing directors who sit on the boards of other firms that follow different diversification and internationalization strategies in different product and geographic markets.
In conclusion, the findings of this study suggest the value of developing sociocognitive theories that address whether and when corporate leaders have the appropriate strategic knowledge and perspective to contribute to corporate governance. Moreover, although little rigorous empirical research has directly examined behavioral processes in CEOboard relationships, our findings also show the potential power of models that link the broader sociostructural context in which boards are embedded, as well as the environmental conditions that surround them, with the microbehavioral processes that occur inside the "black box" of corporate boards.
